

INTRODUCTION

The manuscript volumes presented here originated in two different governmental bodies and therefore provide two different kinds of information.

The two "Indian Books" are a record of His Majesty's Council in South Carolina and were kept by its clerk. During the 1750s, largely because of the deep concern and energy of Governor James Glen, Indian affairs became the almost exclusive province of the governor in council. Two attempts by the Commons House of Assembly, the lower legislative body, to gain a measure of control, first by naming a committee to act with the governor and council, and then by appointing a Commissioner of Indian Affairs and adopting regulations for the entire Indian trade, were ineffective. The primary record of the province's Indian affairs is accordingly to be found in the council journals.³

The "Indian Books" are thus in a sense supplementary to the Council Journals. In 1750, the clerk of the council was instructed to set up a line of demarcation between the two records: documents submitted to the council by the governor were to be included in the journal, as well as in the "Indian Book"; documents received as information copies were to be recorded fully only in the "Indian Book."⁴ Unfortunately, this clear distinction was soon lost.

The "Indian Books," although they give little information about the official action of the council, do contain a number of papers which were considered by it and recorded in its journals. The great mass of documents in the "Indian Books," however, did not receive the formal attention of the council, but were apparently considered too valuable and informative to be thrown away. In a modern office, they would probably have found their way into file folders and metal cabinets. In the eighteenth century, the clerk simply copied the original documents, now lost, into bound volumes, paying little attention to the time they were written or received and not distinguishing covering letters from enclosures.

If we deplore the clerk's lack of system, we can still be thankful for his industry. The variety of documents which he transcribed is great: letters, affidavits, memoranda, messages, trade regulations, muster rolls, and Indian "talks" appear in disordered array, and the information which they contain, sometimes important, sometimes inconsequential, is exceedingly rich. The "Indian Books," though a secondary record for the men who used them, are now a primary source of great value to the historian.

The last of the "Indian Books" ends with a letter written on March 6, 1760 from beleaguered Fort Augusta, shortly after the outbreak of the Chero-

³Ordinance of August 31, 1751, Thomas Cooper and David J. McCord, eds., *The Statutes at Large of South Carolina* (Columbia, 1836-41), vol. 3, 754.

⁴Act of May 16, 1752, *ibid.*, vol. 3, 763.

⁵For a list of MFM and MS council journals, see Charles E. Lee and Ruth S. Green, "A Guide to South Carolina Council Journals, 1671-1775," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, vol. 68, no. 1, 1-13.

⁶MS Council Journals, May 24, 1750, P.R.O. Photostat, no. 4, South Carolina Archives.

kee War. There is no indication why the clerk closed the record at that point. The "Journal of the Directors of the Cherokee Trade, 1762-1765" is by no means a resumption of the previous record, nor is it as valuable. The "Indian Books" reflect the development of the most ambitious Indian policy South Carolina pursued and chronicle its collapse; the "Journal of the Directors of the Cherokee Trade" illustrates a much more modest, but equally frustrated, approach. The directors, constituted by a provincial act of May 29, 1762 which attempted to make trade with the Cherokees a public monopoly, had authority only over this limited endeavor.⁵ The journal, kept as a brief record of their proceedings and as an entry-book for some forty-three documents dealing with the restricted matters within their ken, moves pell-mell from the story of their beginnings to the account of their liquidation. Their demise, brought about by the decision of the British government to assume more direct control over Indian affairs, marked the end not only of the colony's attempts to pursue an independent course on Indian problems outside her boundaries, but also of the "Indian Books" as a discrete record of her government.⁶

Broadly considered, the records relating to Indian affairs from 1754 to 1765 illustrate a growing realization that the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard constituted a single problem of government, rather than thirteen problems of imperial administration. A basic issue governed both British and provincial policy: should the broad middle expanse of the North American continent be controlled by Great Britain, France, or Spain, or should it continue to be parcelled out among the three of them? From the British point of view, the Indian nations who occupied the regions lying between the areas settled by the three contending parties were of the greatest possible importance. Their ability to furnish furs and skins in exchange for European goods provided valuable trade. Their attitude could help or hinder the expansion of settlement and the development of the colonies' agriculture. Above all, their friendship could prove crucial in realizing Britain's continental ambitions.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, Indian policy had been left, for the most part, to the colonial governors. Royal officials tried to direct policy by issuing instructions encouraging the conversion of the Indians, by sending presents (a practice which had begun as early as 1700), by preserving an equal opportunity for the colonists to trade, and by attempting to bring about intercolonial cooperation in handling the Indian problem. By the 1750s, this policy had been recognized as inadequate. The advance of white settlement, competition between traders and between colonies, relations between tribes in the English interest, and the threat from the French all produced problems which demanded a unified and consistent Indian policy.

The first attempt of the crown to achieve a common policy in Indian affairs concerned the Iroquois. Here the main problem was to secure the aid of the Five Nations, who had been subject to the conflicting interests of New

⁵Cooper, *Statutes*, vol. 4, 168.

⁶The clerk of the council was paid for "entries in the Indian Book" from 1757 to 1768. But from 1761 until the Revolution, he was never ordered to record any paper relating to Indian affairs laid before the council in a separate "Indian Book," or elsewhere. This may explain the absence of any "Indian Books" after the Cherokee War.

York and New England. In 1688, the crown established a Dominion of New England designed to increase imperial authority in the colonies and make for stronger resistance against the French. Using this limited central authority, the English succeeded in confirming the Iroquois as their allies.⁷ The first step toward developing a similar regulation of Indian affairs in the south was taken when the Board of Trade, in an attempt to resolve differences between Virginia and South Carolina over Indian trade, asked Francis Nicholson, then on his way to Charleston to take up his new post as governor, to confer with his counterpart in Virginia, Governor Spotswood.⁸ Another proposal, made by the Board of Trade in 1721, would have established a central military authority in the colonies, with a governor general in charge of Indian relations.

It was with these precedents in mind that the crown appointed William Johnson and Edmund Atkin Superintendents of Indian Affairs. Johnson's area of authority included Pennsylvania and the colonies north; Atkin's, Maryland and the colonies to the south. These royal agents were only to have control over Indian diplomacy. They were not given powers over Indian trade until after the French and Indian War, when they were charged with its supervision for a few years. In spite of the new appointments, the colonial governors continued to exercise control over Indian relations and, at least in the southern colonies, exerted almost as much influence during the war as they had previously.⁹

Along the frontier between England's southern colonies and the French and Spanish settlements at Mobile, at St Augustine, and in Louisiana, four great Indian tribes held sway: the Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Cherokee.

The Creeks' traditional policy was to maintain the balance of power in the southeast; but the French Fort Toulouse lay within their nation, at the forks of the Alabama, leaving their relations with the English somewhat in doubt. In 1717, following the Yamasee War, they had made peace with Carolina, confirming their friendship four years later when Sir Francis Nicholson, the new royal governor, arrived in Charleston.¹⁰ Governor Robert Johnson had negotiated another treaty with the Creeks, but it was not renewed until 1753, when Governor Glen succeeded in maneuvering Malatchi, the Creek head man, into coming to Charleston.¹¹ The Chickasaw, a small tribe whose fighting ability gave them an importance out of proportion to their number, were inveterate enemies of the French, their hatred dating from 1736, when the French attempted to exterminate them for giving asylum to the fleeing

⁷John R. Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier, A Study of Indian Relations, War, Trade, and Land Problems in the Southern Wilderness, 1754-1775* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944), pp. 4-5.

⁸Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732*, 2d. ed. reprint (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 203-4.

⁹Alden, *Stuart*, p. 5.

¹⁰Francis Nicholson to the Board of Trade, South Carolina, July 13, 1721, Colonial Office, South Carolina, vol. 358 (MFM-PRO 15, Reel 041, Library of Congress); *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Journals of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, Sept. 20, 1710-Aug. 29, 1718* (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1956), pp. 224-25, 246-48, 290-91.

¹¹*The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents relating to Indian Affairs, May 21, 1750-Aug. 7, 1754* (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958), pp. 388-414.

Natchez. As long as Carolina supplied them with arms and ammunition, the Chickasaw could be counted on to harass the French and their allies. Although the Choctaws were the principal allies of the French in the southeast, there was always a possibility that the French might become unable to supply them and provide the English with the opportunity of opening trade. The Catawba, a small tribe located in the northeastern part of South Carolina, decimated by smallpox and by war with the Six Nations, still proved valuable to the English on the Virginia frontier and during the Cherokee War of 1760-61.

But the chief allies of the English in the southeast were the Cherokees. They had been at peace with Carolina since 1716, and their alliance with the English dated from 1730, when seven of their head men and warriors signed a treaty in London. In the early period of settlement, the Carolina traders were more interested in the Creeks and other Indian nations south and west of Charleston. Trade with the mountaineers was of little importance. By 1750, however, nearly half of the Carolina traders were licensed for the Cherokee trade.¹³ The path to the nation from Charleston and Augusta was relatively short, and the skins obtained from the Cherokees were among the best to be had. The tribe occupied a strategic position on the Carolina frontier. Any French advance could be easily opposed, blocked or joined from the Cherokees' country. Hence they could easily influence neighboring tribes to follow suit. Moreover, Cherokee policy affected southern and western tribes who were frequent visitors to the nation.

South Carolina's rivalry with Virginia in Cherokee affairs was as important to the outcome of the continental struggle as the success or failure of the French in their Cherokee intrigues. This intercolonial conflict was of long standing. As early as 1711, the General Assembly passed an act requiring Virginia traders to obtain licenses in Charleston.¹⁴ Virginia protested vigorously to the crown, because until 1740, when a passage to the Overhills was discovered, the Virginians had to cross the Carolina back country to reach the Cherokee nation. The crown ordered the act repealed. But the colony's antipathy to the traders from the north did not abate. In 1751, a Cherokee delegation from the Overhill towns to Williamsburg obtained promises of trade. But Governor Glen denounced this as a violation of the 1730 treaty and informed the president of the Virginia council, Lewis Burwell, that the Cherokees were well taken care of by his colony and would continue to be so.¹⁵

The French advance into the Ohio valley in 1753 further complicated relations between the two colonies. Virginia's governor, Robert Dinwiddie, disagreed with Glen over the seriousness of the French move. Glen believed that the Ohio Company, which Dinwiddie supported, had provoked the French advance by settling at the forks of the Ohio. When Dinwiddie asked South Carolina to help secure Catawba, Cherokee, and Creek gunmen for service against the French, Glen and his council refused. They suspected that Dinwiddie would use such an alliance as an opportunity to open trade with the Cherokees. Imperial interest, however, outweighed Carolina's commercial

¹³Crane, *Southern Frontier*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁴Cooper, *Statutes*, vol. 2, 357-59.

¹⁵*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-54*, pp. 159-61.

considerations. With George Washington's capitulation at Great Meadows, the crown realized that France was planning to force the Virginians out of the Ohio valley and that the time had come to resist. Glen was ordered not to obstruct Dinwiddie's efforts to oppose the enemy and to see that South Carolina help finance English operations against the French.¹⁵

Despite her apprehensions, the decision to oppose the French in the Ohio valley proved advantageous to South Carolina. For Glen was finally granted royal funds to build a fort in the Upper Cherokee nation. This project had first been proposed in 1747, but since floundered for lack of money. When Charles Pinckney, South Carolina's agent in London, reported to the Board of Trade that the French were planning to build a fort and open trade in the Cherokee Overhill towns, Sir Thomas Robinson, secretary of state for the southern department, with responsibility for colonial affairs, set aside £1,000 of the money assigned to Dinwiddie for construction of the South Carolina fort. Earlier, as an inducement to the Cherokees to join Virginia's forces, Governor Dinwiddie had also promised to build a fort to guard the Overhills. But the Virginians left this fort, at Chote, ungarrisoned, and the Cherokees were forced to look back to South Carolina for protection. The new fort was to be the second South Carolina post in the Cherokee nation. The first, Fort Prince George, was built in 1753, at Keowee in the Lower settlements. This was designed to protect the Lower Indians from Creek attacks and prevent them from moving to the Overhills, leaving the northwestern part of the colony's frontier exposed. In 1754 and 1755, the Overhill Cherokees, disappointed by the Virginians and exposed to attacks from French-allied Indians, reminded Glen of his promise to build a new fort. The story of its construction is inextricably bound up in the complicated crisis in Indian affairs which developed at the same time.

This crisis in Indian affairs was compounded of friction over settlement (in which there was disagreement with North Carolina), disappointment with inadequate trade reforms (in which Georgia's trade policy caused added difficulties), and the problems of fulfilling the alliance against France (in which differences with Virginia played a large part).

South Carolina's policy in regard to frontier expansion was designed not to offend the Indians. Glen did not favor intrusion into the Indian hunting grounds beyond the recognized boundaries, and a South Carolina act of 1739 had forbidden any private purchases of Indian land. But the pressure of settlement on the frontier forced Glen to seek a cession from the Cherokees. In 1747, George Pawley obtained a deed, signed by thirty-four head men, transferring the territory between Ninety Six and Long Cane Creek. Even before this treaty was negotiated, settlements had been established in the Saluda valley, between Saluda Old Town and Ninety Six. By 1756, the Cherokees were complaining to their trader, James Beamer, that there were settlers above Long Cane Creek on Rocky River. Only the corridor from Long Cane Creek to Fort Prince George and the area around the fort itself were considered white men's territory. But as other settlers, ignoring the "Dividens" line, made

¹⁵Alden, *Stuart*, p. 39.

their homes above the boundary, the Cherokees became increasingly alarmed about the security of their hunting grounds.¹⁶

North Carolina settlers did not reach the Cherokee country until after 1763, and the colony had no trade with the tribe. During the war, North Carolina's Indian policy mainly consisted of following Virginia's lead in working to obtain Cherokee support against the French. The northern colony differed even more strongly with South Carolina in her approach to the problem of Catawba lands. While Glen forbade settlement within thirty miles of the Catawba nation, North Carolina refused to recognize the little tribe's claims at all, and issued grants in the Catawba nation without even ascertaining whether the land was in North Carolina.¹⁷

But it was a new problem, that of competition in the Indian trade with the young colony of Georgia, which did most to force South Carolina into reforming her Indian affairs. Rivalry with Georgia had begun soon after the new colony was established. The Georgia trustees adopted an act regulating the Indian trade in January, 1735, which they modeled after the South Carolina regulatory act of 1731. This contained a clause excluding all traders not licensed by the colony from the territory of the province and placed James Oglethorpe, the governing trustee, in charge of Georgia's Indian affairs. On his arrival in the colony, Oglethorpe attempted to use the act to secure a monopoly of the Creek and Chickasaw trade. Captain Patrick Mackay, who had been commissioned by the South Carolina legislature to build a garrison in the Creek nation, was sent to the Creeks to enforce the Georgia regulations, and bloodshed between his soldiers and the Carolina traders was narrowly averted. The South Carolina traders appealed to their government for protection, but in this case only the crown could settle the dispute. In 1738, the crown decided that both colonies could trade with the Creeks and that both were entitled to license traders. South Carolina traders, although they were thus forced to tolerate intruders from Georgia, continued to dominate the Creek trade.

No such understanding extended to trade with the Cherokee nation. An illegal trade grew up between the Lower towns and Augusta, especially in rum, which flowed to the Cherokees in enough quantity to cause Carolina concern. The Georgia authorities either looked the other way or took their share of the profits. Even during the crisis of 1751, when the Cherokee trade was placed under embargo, Georgia's cooperation was not easily won.¹⁸ In 1755, Governor Glen, at the insistence of the Cherokee head men, agreed to prohibit the rum trade. But the following year, Raymond Demere, the commander of the Overhill fort expedition, complained that rum brought in from Georgia was causing serious problems in his relations with the Indians: John Elliott, an Overhill trader, was bringing in 100 kegs; Robert Goudy was supplying rum to pack-horsemen at Ninety Six; and others were planning to ship rum from Augusta and elsewhere in Georgia. Demere sent Governor Lyttelton a list of those involved. Although Lyttelton gave him permission to seize Elliott's

¹⁶Robert L. Meriwether, *The Expansion of South Carolina* (Kingsport: Southern Publishers, Inc., 1940), pp. 194-95.

¹⁷Alden, *Stuart*, p. 22.

¹⁸*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-54*, pp. 120-21, 170-72.

cargo, Demere was forced to allow some of it to be transported to the Overhills so that Elliott could pay his debts to the Indians.¹⁹

South Carolina traders frequently complained of competition from Georgia traders. James Maxwell, a principal trader to the Cherokees, told the governor and council in 1750 that the trade of the nation was "in the Utmost Confusion by such Numbers that goes there and so must continue till the Affair is settled with the Colony of Georgia" He did not see any point in taking out a license from Carolina unless the government was prepared to support the trader's right to the town assigned him. Other traders had told him that they would be willing to pay double the cost of licenses if they could be secured in the trade of their towns, and would pay to maintain an officer in the nation to regulate the trade if the governor would settle the matter with Georgia. Maxwell proposed that this officer supervise the distribution of presents from the king and see that only clean-dressed skins were purchased. Foul skins had caused prices to sink lower each year; untrimmed skins came from "the Number of Straglers that goes there with Rum &c which if not settled will be the Ruin of every Trader . . . and Hurt the Merchants that trust them so they earnestly beg that you will lay their Miserable situation before the Government and endeavor to get a Regulation in the Trade which will Enable every Licensed Trader to do his Merchant Justice and save Large Expence to the Publick."²⁰

In addition to the problems caused by competition from Georgia, weaknesses in the trading system itself also encouraged the Assembly to turn its attention to the state of the trade. The last act regulating Indian affairs had been passed in 1739. In a memorial to the council on May 17, 1749, William Pinckney, commissioner of Indian affairs, reported that he had frequent applications "for redress against Interlopers and Persons vizit'g and Trading with the Indian nations without License & of their own authority to the Great prejudice of the Licensed Trader."²¹ Pinckney pointed out that the 1739 trade act was not enforceable, for even though the act subjected those trading without a license to severe penalties, there was no one to whom he could direct a warrant to impose them. Since Pinckney was apparently opposed to executing the warrants himself, he asked the governor and council to designate deputies. But no action was taken. Edmund Atkin later pointed out the real trouble to the Board of Trade. He said that the duties of the commissioner included visiting the Indian tribes to investigate the traders' conduct and to hear and redress Indian grievances. But these duties were not carried out. For the commissioner was not specifically required by the act to visit the Indians. Indeed, the assembly had made no allowance for that purpose since 1735, when the commissioner had been sent to the Creeks on a special mission. Since then, the colony had sent agents to the Creeks and Cherokees on only two occasions.²²

Cherokee complaints against the traders were of long standing. The

¹⁹Below, pp. 149, 160-61, 358-59, 359-60.

²⁰Council Journal, May 11, 1750, P.R.O. Photostat, no. 4.

²¹Council Journal, May 17, 1749, vol. 17, 388-89.

²²Wilbur R. Jacobs, ed., *Indians of the Southern Colonial Frontier, The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 1755* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1954), pp. 19-20.

Indians were deeply in debt to the traders and accused them of using false weights and measures. White intrusion into Cherokee hunting grounds made matters worse. During the winter of 1750-51, white men raided a camp on the Savannah River and stole three hundred and thirty deer skins.²³ James Francis, justice of the peace at Saluda, aggravated tensions by refusing to help recover the skins. In March, thirty Cherokees attacked William Clements's store on the Oconee River, killing his servant Jeremiah Sweeney and a Chickasaw from the New Windsor settlement.²⁴ Resentment against the traders reached the boiling point in April when, incited by visiting Northern Indians, Stecoe townsmen plundered Bernard Hugh's store. Traders in the Lower towns fled for their lives. Attacks on isolated inhabitants in the middle and back country were also reported.

When the alarm reached Charleston, the governor called the General Assembly into emergency session. The commons demanded an embargo on trade until the Cherokees gave satisfaction for their offenses. Glen opposed such a break with the tribe, and the council preferred sending an army to demand satisfaction.²⁵ Since the commons refused to agree to such an expensive undertaking, Glen was forced to adopt the embargo. He sent letters to three of the Lower towns demanding the surrender, within two months, of the chief offenders and ordered the embargo to be enforced until this demand was met.²⁶ When Glen's deadline expired in August, the Indians' only reply had been to declare that they would give no satisfaction until trade was restored.²⁷ In response to the embargo, the Overhill towns had sent a delegation to Williamsburg. There Little Carpenter persuaded the Virginians to open trade with his towns. It became imperative, then, for South Carolina to reopen the trade, to keep Virginia out. On August 24, Captain John Fairchild, leader of a Ranger troop patrolling the frontier, wrote from Ninety Six to say that Richard Smith, using an Indian guide to take him behind the Catawba nation to the Cherokees, planned to bring in trade goods from Virginia and defy the embargo.²⁸

With trade at a standstill, pack-horse trains coming through the mountains from Virginia, and the old trade regulations ineffective, the assembly was forced to take action. On August 31, 1751, they passed an ordinance directing the governor, the council, and a select committee of the commons to make rules and orders for the regulation of trade with Indians friendly to the colony.²⁹ These were to last for a period of six months. These reforms were introduced in a Cherokee treaty negotiated in November.³⁰ In exchange for Cherokee promises to surrender Sweeney's killer, to pay for the goods plundered from Bernard Hugh's store, and to send Little Carpenter down to explain his conduct, the colony agreed to restore the trade and pay for the skins stolen from

²³*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-54*, pp. 22-23, 113.

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 11, 13.

²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 52-56.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 66-68; see also MS Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, June 14, 1751, vol. 26, 588-91, South Carolina Archives, and Council Journal, June 15, 1751, vol. 18, 178-79.

²⁷*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-1754*, pp. 100-1.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 121-22, 159-61.

²⁹Cooper, *Statutes*, vol. 3, 754-55; *South Carolina Gazette*, Sept. 2, 1751.

³⁰*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-54*, pp. 187-96.

the Estatoe Indians. Traders were to use standard weights and measures, and the head man of each town was to be furnished with a set of these to check the traders' measurements whenever necessary. The Cherokees were to be allowed no more than twenty-four weight of leather on credit to outfit themselves before each hunting season. All skins sold were to be properly trimmed, and the traders were to buy them only in those towns where they were licensed to trade.⁸¹ The governor, the council, and the special committee of the commons, acting under the ordinance of August 31, which had made them a temporary regulatory body for this purpose, then confirmed these reforms in an ordinance for regulating the Cherokee Trade.⁸² They took upon themselves the responsibility for granting licenses to trade and forbade the Indian trade commissioner to issue any license without a warrant from them.⁸³ They stipulated that the names of the towns assigned to the trader were to appear on his license.⁸⁴ They reduced the limit on credit from twenty-four to twenty weight of leather and banned the rum trade until March 3, 1752.⁸⁵ They instructed the traders to take just weights and measures to the nation and they declared any debt over six buckskins illegal.

The reforms of the treaty and the ordinance could have become a permanent factor in improving relations with the Cherokees and even with the other Indian tribes of the region, since they became the basis for a new law regulating all the Indian trade of the province. This law, the Indian trade act of May 16, 1752, continued to restrict unlicensed trade with Indians friendly to the colony, except for the settlement Indians, the Chickasaws at New Windsor, and those Euchees and Catawbas who lived in the colony. The power to issue licenses was returned to the commissioner, but the governor and the council were given authority to revoke them if there were sufficient cause. The public treasury, with the approval of the governor and council, was to pay the commissioner for official journeys to the Indian country.⁸⁶ But these remedies failed to have the desired effect. The commissioner still declined to visit the Indian nations to enforce the act, and Glen had to rely on traders, such as Ludowick Grant in the Cherokees and Lachlan McGillivray in the Creeks, to furnish information on the effectiveness of the legislation and on Indian affairs in general. Grant reported in May that the Cherokees distrusted the scales. They were accustomed to the traders' steelyards and believed that they lost the half pounds in the weight of their skins when scales were used.⁸⁷ Many traders threw away the new weights and measures given them in Charleston. Those who did try to use them were at a disadvantage and were soon forced to abandon them in order to compete. Thus, chances to achieve a real reform in Indian trade, as the colony had done after the Yamasee War of 1715, were lost.

In 1755, Governor Glen met Old Hop, the head man of the Cherokee

⁸¹*Ibid.*

⁸²*Ibid.*, pp. 198-200.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴Council Journal, Dec. 3-4, 1751, vol. 18, 512-13.

⁸⁵*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-1754*, pp. 198-200.

⁸⁶Cooper, *Statutes*, vol. 3, 763-71.

⁸⁷*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-54*, pp. 261-64.

nation, at Saluda and his inability to enforce the trade agreements he made there produced more Cherokee complaints. Early in 1757, Old Hop charged Glen with duplicity. He claimed that Glen had agreed upon certain price regulations, which the traders had then refused to follow, and had promised another trader for Chote, who had never materialized.³⁸ Little Carpenter, visiting Charleston soon afterwards, complained that while prices had been lowered, the traders had quickly raised them again and asked for a schedule of prices to show to the traders on his return. Shortages of goods and attempts to monopolize the trade aroused further discontent. Robert Goudy, licensed to trade at two towns, Great Tellico and Chatuga, opened a store at Ninety Six and hired pack-horsemen to trade for him. The resulting lack of goods at Great Tellico alienated the town.³⁹ John Elliott was accused of trying to engross the Upper towns' trade and of charging exorbitant prices.⁴⁰ Although the charges against the Scottish trader were dropped, they were not forgotten: Elliott was one of the first men scalped at the outbreak of the Cherokee War.

In the Creek trade, the issue of lower prices caused a serious rift in the Indians' relations with South Carolina, involved Governor Glen in a misunderstanding with the commons house, and gave the alert French a chance to increase their influence with the Creek nation. From 1748 until 1753, the Creeks were at war with the Cherokees. Glen finally succeeded in getting Malatchi, the leading Creek head man, to exchange representatives with the Cherokees and ratify a peace with them. Although the Creeks renewed their treaty of friendship with the colony at that time, they were still not able to get the lower trade prices they wanted. As a sop to Creek pride, Glen persuaded the traders to lower their rates on bullets and flints, but the new prices were never really put into effect.⁴¹

Because a peace between the Creeks and Cherokees would be dangerous to the Choctaws, the French could not afford to let it stand. The following autumn, after a grand meeting at the Alabama fort, where they succeeded in negotiating a peace between the Creeks and Choctaws, the French told the Creeks that the English were planning on their destruction. The interpreter told the Creeks that the English were continually encroaching on their lands and warned them of the danger from the Ogeechee settlements in this respect. Nearly all the Upper Creek head men, along with three from the Lower towns—The Handsome Fellow, Deval's Landlord, and The Wolf—were present. As a result of these French charges, the Creeks became confused and advised the Gun Merchant, who was preparing to meet the Cherokees in the woods to exchange tokens of peace, not to go. But the Gun Merchant refused to believe them and went anyway.⁴²

At this time, the French were advancing into the Ohio valley, and the arrangement of a peace between their allies, the Choctaws, and the Creeks was part of an attempt by Louis de Kerlerec, the governor of Louisiana, to establish control over the confederation. He considered the Creeks more dangerous to

³⁸Below, pp. 333-34.

³⁹Below, pp. 8, 149, 315.

⁴⁰Below, pp. 138, 267.

⁴¹*Indian Affairs Documents, 1750-54* pp. 387-414; below, p. 56.

⁴²Below, pp. 57-58.

the French colony than any other tribe in the southeast and more likely to attack the English than the Cherokees. In a conference at Mobile in March, 1755, Kerlerec attempted to turn the Creeks against the English. He repeated the charges that Carolina and Georgia had designs on Creek lands and that Fort Prince George would be a base for an Anglo-Cherokee attack against them. On the last day, he enjoined them not to quarrel with the Choctaws and, though he knew they would not actually attack the Chickasaws themselves, urged the Creeks not to hinder the prosecution of the Choctaws' war against them. Kerlerec then distributed presents.⁴³

The Creeks were kept uneasy all winter. The French made such judicious use of their presents that Lachlan McGillivray, who attempted to stop the rumors of an Anglo-Cherokee attack, said that the presents were "more prevailing with the Indians than all the Rhetorick of Aristotle . . ."⁴⁴ On April 22, 1755, the Gun Merchant, who had spent the winter with the Cherokees, returned to the Creek nation. He had conferred with the Cherokees on several matters, including trade, and, finding that the Cherokees could buy their goods at much lower rates, had asked the Cherokee traders at Chote to bring goods to the Creeks. One, Robert Goudy, had obliged him, taking twenty horse loads of goods, buying the Creeks' skins, and returning to Chote with goods to spare. At the same time, the Gun Merchant had visited Chote himself, at the king's invitation. There he had enjoyed a grand reception and settled all matters relating to peace between the two tribes.

The head men of the Creek nation met with McGillivray and four of their traders on April 27. McGillivray interpreted the governor's letters to them, and the Gun Merchant reported on his stay with the Cherokees, demanding that the four traders lower their prices. The traders suggested that the matter be referred to the governor. This so angered the Creeks, who remembered that Glen had not effectively lowered rates in 1753, that the Gun Merchant declared he would not go to Charleston again until he got a "Cherokee trade."⁴⁵ The French responded to the Carolina traders' refusal to lower prices by arranging a meeting with the Creeks at the Alabama Fort and there lowering rates on their goods. They met no difficulty in then persuading the Creeks to ratify peace with the Choctaws.⁴⁶

This French success alarmed Carolina. If the agreement had been carried out, it would have led to the virtual annihilation of the Chickasaws, whose defense against the Choctaws depended on the free passage of arms and ammunition through the Creek country. The Creeks had even gone so far as to declare that, but for their reliance on English trade, they would favor the French. Kerlerec, recognizing the truth of this, sent goods from New Orleans to Fort Toulouse, furnishing a temporary store there while he applied to his superiors for enough supplies to offer trade to the Creeks on the same basis as the Choctaws. So far as the South Carolinians were concerned, the Upper Creeks, now fortified with the knowledge that there were goods at the French

⁴³Below, pp. 58-60.

⁴⁴Below, pp. 60-62.

⁴⁵Below, pp. 62-64.

⁴⁶Below, pp. 66-67.

fort, were "to a man out of humour."⁴⁷ Governor Glen and his council, after three unsuccessful attempts to get the Creeks to Charleston, became convinced that the fate of the Chickasaws was sealed and that the Creeks were about to attack the back settlements. On the advice of the council, Glen convened the assembly for September 15, 1755.⁴⁸ The governor's opening message explained his alarm: first, South Carolina's strongest tie with the Creeks, the trade, had been weakened by the opening of stores at the Alabama Fort and St. Augustine; secondly, ratification of peace between the Creeks and Choctaws had made the destruction of the Chickasaw imminent; and last, there was now a danger of a Creek alliance with the French. In response, Glen suggested that the Creeks' affection could be regained through the liberal use of presents and the lowering of trade prices and that they might eventually be persuaded to transfer their lands to the crown. But Glen needed authority from the assembly to put the lower prices into effect.⁴⁹

A skeptical commons recommended that Major Henry Hyrne be sent to the Creeks to make any necessary price reductions, but that no further action should be taken until Hyrne had submitted a report. Glen thought such a mission unnecessary and contended that the house had overstepped its bounds by naming the agent to be sent.⁵⁰ In reply, the commons charged that the whole crisis was imaginary and that it had been fabricated by Lachlan McIntosh and Lachlan McGillivray in an attempt to monopolize the Creek trade. For if the prices were lowered, the number of licensed traders would have to be reduced.⁵¹ The assembly compromised by creating a commission similar to the one made for Cherokee affairs in 1751. This commission, consisting of the governor, the council, and certain members of the assembly, was empowered to regulate the Creek trade and to lower prices. However, the commission could not reduce the number of traders to the nation without the consent of a majority of the assemblymen on it.⁵² In fact, the commons had very little choice in the matter. For Glen had already written to the Creeks promising that the prices would be lowered if they came to Charleston.

After some difficulty, the Gun Merchant was persuaded to meet the Governor. He arrived in the colony in December, with about sixty warriors and head men. Glen's objectives were threefold: he wanted to build a fort in the Creek nation, both to offset the increasing influence of the French and to provide a base from which to attack the Alabama fort; he wanted to persuade the Creeks not to molest the Georgians; and he wanted them either to oblige the Choctaws to make peace with the Chickasaws and trade with Carolina or fight the Choctaws themselves.⁵³ In return, he suggested lowering prices in the Creek trade and allowing the Indians the use of steelyards in weighing their

⁴⁷Council Journal, August 18, 1755, P.R.O. Photostat, no. 6, 303.

⁴⁸Council Journal, Sept. 1, 1755, *ibid.*, 327.

⁴⁹Commons Journal, Sept. 16 & 22, 1755, vol. 30, pt. 2, 599-602, 630-34.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 619-22.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 636-37.

⁵²Cooper, *Statutes*, vol. 4, 19.

⁵³Transcripts of Records relating to South Carolina in the British Public Record Office, vol. 27, 1756-57, 40-63, South Carolina Archives.

skins for sale.⁵⁴ But the Gun Merchant was the only Indian to agree to such a treaty. One of the head men in the French interest hurried home with the news of the treaty and raised "such a Blaze" that a huge majority of both the Lower and Upper nations had already rejected it by the time the Gun Merchant, perhaps purposely returning in more leisurely fashion, arrived.⁵⁵ Later in the summer, McGillivray reported relations between Carolina and the Creeks so bad that unless urgent steps were taken to improve them, the French would bring the Creeks to war with the English.⁵⁶

In disrupting the proposed treaty, the French demonstrated their power over the confederation. In South Carolina, the time-tested device of sending an agent to the Creeks had to be used to repair the damage. The agent, Daniel Pepper, was instructed to report on the nature of Creek objections to the treaty and on the extent of French influence, to answer Creek objections to the white settlement on the Ogeechee, and to advise the governor on the position of the Choctaws. Pepper found that hostility to the treaty remained "latent in the Breasts of a great many which only Time and good Management" could eradicate.⁵⁷ He was unable to persuade the Creeks to accept an English fort, nor were his attempts to open a Choctaw trade and bring a Chickasaw-Choctaw peace then successful. But when Atkin finally succeeded in opening trade with the Choctaws, in 1759, it was largely as a result of Pepper's efforts.

The French were unable to exploit their advantage in the Creek nation, since they could not produce enough trade to eliminate the Indians' dependence on the English. In January, 1758, the Wolf and other Upper Creeks visited Governor Lyttelton. They asked for reduced prices and standard weights and measures for paint, powder, and cloth. The Creeks were put off with the explanation that the 1756 treaty had never been accepted and that any price fixing would have to be worked out with the merchants and traders and approved by Georgia.⁵⁸ But the French were so short of supplies at the Alabama fort, as a result of the English blockade, that the Creeks were forced to accept South Carolina's prices.

Indeed, the blockade of French ports was so effective that the French were unable to supply even their best allies, the Choctaws, properly. In the spring of 1758, two or three hundred Choctaws tried to buy goods from the English traders in the Upper Creek towns. The murder of two Creeks by the Choctaws gave the French an opportunity to cause a rift between the two tribes and spoil the chances of trade for a season.⁵⁹ But when Atkin arrived in Creek country the following spring, he found sixty Choctaws impatiently waiting to talk about trade.⁶⁰ Despite further French efforts to prevent it, the Choctaws signed a treaty of friendship and commerce with Atkin on July 18, 1759. A

⁵⁴Council Journal, Jan. 10, 1756, vol. 25, 42-82.

⁵⁵Below, p. 295; Council Journal, July 14, 1756, vol. 25, 308-10.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷Below, p. 295.

⁵⁸Council Journal, Jan. 25, Jan. 30 & Feb. 1, 1758, vol. 26, 100-2, 108-11, 113-20; *South Carolina Gazette*, Jan. 26, 1758.

⁵⁹David Douglass to John McQueen, Fort Augusta, April 26, 1758, William Henry Lyttelton Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (microfilm copy).

⁶⁰Lachlan McGillivray to Lyttelton, Augusta, April 25, 1759, *ibid.*

month later, the superintendent reported that the first cargo of goods had left for the Choctaw nation.⁶¹

While French influence with the Creeks and Choctaws was apparently on the decline by 1759, the interest the French had so long maintained among the Cherokees was helping to plunge that nation into war with the South Carolinians. In less than a decade, the French had grown strong enough to make the Indian nation on whose alliance the survival of South Carolina most depended enemies of the English. Agents disguised as deserters from Fort Toulouse and Illinois were active in Cherokee country, and French-allied Indians came in at will. In December, 1753, sixteen Ottawa braves and other warriors from the Five Nations arrived at Chote to persuade the Little Carpenter and other head men to go to New Orleans, meet the governor, and make peace with the Choctaws. But the Little Carpenter refused to go. Following the departure of the French emissaries, numerous Cherokees were killed on the paths, and Great Tellico was attacked. The Cherokees believed that the Ottawas were responsible.⁶²

By 1756, when the British began construction of Fort Loudoun, French intrigue had already made Carolina — Cherokee relations difficult. A strong pro-French faction appeared at Great Tellico. Situated on the western extremity of the Overhill towns, bearing the brunt of the French-allied Indian attacks and subject to the neglect of their trader, Robert Goudy, the town had good reason to seek new allies. In the summer of 1756, when the Fort Loudoun expedition had already arrived at Fort Prince George, the Mankiller of Tellico, with Old Hop's blessing, led a party of twenty-four Cherokees to Fort Toulouse at the Alabamas. Monberaut, the French commander, was unprepared for their visit, and three days passed before he could spread a table for them and give them presents. Although Monberaut promised trade prices lower than those offered by the English, he had no authority to conclude a treaty, and part of the Mankiller's party went on to New Orleans to obtain a more binding commitment from the French.⁶³ There, the Cherokees asked the French to build a fort and store at Hiwassee Old Town in return for an alliance. But Kerlerrec was unable to take advantage of the situation, for the governor general of New France vetoed his alliance. In spite of this, the French persisted in their efforts to turn the Cherokees away from the English and open trade with them.

Indeed, the chief reason for the crown's decision to build a fort in the Carolina Overhills in 1754 had been fear that the French might establish just such a foothold in the Cherokee nation. By April of that year, Lord Halifax, the president of the Board of Trade, had become convinced that the French were planning to encircle the colonies and force the English back to the sea and that forts should be erected in the Overhill country, in Upper Creek territory, and at other points on the frontier.⁶⁴ When Charles Pinckney argued the case for a fort before the board in June, 1754, he had a sympathetic audience, especially in view of new evidence that the French had already proposed

⁶¹Edmund Atkin to Lyttelton, Spencer's nr. Mucculassa, August 18, 1759, *ibid.*

⁶²Council Journal, Oct. 19, 1754, P.R.O. Photostat, no. 5, 52-54.

⁶³Below, pp. 243-45.

⁶⁴Alden, *Stuart*, p. 38.

building a fort in the Cherokee nation and that the Indians might soon agree to it. Since other colonies would benefit from the building of an English fort, Pinckney argued that South Carolina should not bear all the expense. Assistance from the crown was forthcoming. On July 5, Sir Thomas Robinson, secretary of state for the southern department, sent £10,000 credit to Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia for the defense of the American colonies. Dinwiddie was to co-operate with Glen in allocating part of this for the Carolina fort. But the two governors were unable to agree on the amount, and Dinwiddie finally supplied only £1,000, suggesting that the South Carolina assembly provide the remainder. The commons would only agree to allocate the money in the form of a loan to the crown, and, because of a dispute with the upper house over the tax bill, even this was not forthcoming. The assembly finally voted a £2,000 loan, which was subscribed to at the last moment by a group of public-spirited citizens. Glen's expedition left Charleston on May 19, 1756.⁶⁶

Glen himself never reached the Cherokee nation. By the time he arrived at Ninety Six, orders came from his successor, William Henry Lyttelton, to return to Charleston. Captain Raymond Demere, in joint command of the Independent Company and the former commander of Fort Frederica in Georgia, was ordered to proceed to Fort Prince George, and the militia was discharged. Lyttelton's instructions from the crown called for the colony to make a direct grant, instead of a loan, to finance the construction of the fort. With a grant of £4,000 from the assembly, Lyttelton was able to reorganize the expedition. Demere was given command, and William Gerard DeBrahm, who had been an engineer in the service of Emperor Charles VI and recently employed to rebuild a curtain line for the defense of Charleston, was given the task of designing the fort and supervising its building.⁶⁶

As soon as reinforcements and supplies for the expedition arrived at Keowee, Demere set out for the Overhills. His expedition arrived at Tomatley, the Little Carpenter's home, on October 1, 1756, and work began on the fort three days later.⁶⁷ DeBrahm had planned such an elaborate system of defense that little progress was apparent. Old Hop, who could not understand the delay, warned the expedition that the party from Great Tellico would shortly be returning from the French and probably planned to fall on the troops before they could finish the fort and effectively defend themselves. The animosity which had prevailed between Demere and DeBrahm since they arrived in the Overhills was quickly set aside. In the latter part of November, Demere optimistically reported that the fort would be completed in two months.⁶⁸ In mid-December, however, DeBrahm suddenly announced that the fort would be finished in a week and that he would then discharge the militia working on it.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the Mankiller of Tellico had returned to the nation, and the English learned of his plot to bring in the French to attack the fort.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 38, 48-49.

⁶⁷W. Roy Smith, *South Carolina as a Royal Province, 1719-1776* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1903), pp. 203-4, 206-7.

⁶⁸Below, pp. 214-19.

⁶⁹Below, pp. 232-33, 259-60.

⁷⁰Below, pp. 271-72.

Demere was now faced with a serious crisis. His authority over the expedition had been challenged and his fort, in its present condition, was indefensible. The threat of a French-inspired attack was real enough to make hesitation dangerous. A council of war agreed that DeBrahm had exceeded his authority, warned the men not to listen to him, and asked for instructions from the governor. At the first sign of mutiny, the offender was court-martialled and, though he was ignorant of military regulations, sentenced to two hundred lashes with a cat-o'-nine-tails.⁷⁰ DeBrahm, afraid that the French would attack, slipped away on Christmas night, leaving instructions for Demere to complete the fort. DeBrahm's desertion made even the friendly Indians uneasy and gave the Tellico braves an opportunity to say that the rest of the company would follow the engineer as soon as the French approached.⁷¹

But increased fears of a French attack also forced the expedition out of its lethargy. When Captain John Postell refused to order his recalcitrant men inside the works, Demere compelled them.⁷² The men built huts to live in, mounted the great guns on stocks, and cut wood for the palisades. By the time Lyttelton's orders arrived, on April 2, Demere already had a fort capable of withstanding an Indian attack. On July 30, 1757, he reported that Fort Loudoun was completed "and in a posture of Defense."⁷³

Before Demere had arrived in the Overhills, Major Andrew Lewis, who built Virginia's fort at Chote, had warned him that the two Cherokee leaders, Little Carpenter and Old Hop, were involved with the French. While Lewis was at Chote and Demere was at Fort Prince George on his way to the Overhills, the Nuntewees, the Savannahs, and the French all sent messages to Little Carpenter. The Overhill Cherokees suddenly refused to fulfil their promise to help Virginia against the French in the Ohio valley. A Cherokee council, meeting in the town house at Chote, then decided to order Demere back to Charleston. Lewis happened to overhear Little Carpenter explain that he could then capture the few soldiers who had already reached the Overhills and seize their weapons. The following day, Lewis persuaded them to retract and to write a letter welcoming Demere to the Cherokee country. But Lewis feared that the matter was not closed, that the head men had retracted only to deceive him and to "put a Gloss on their Navery," and that Demere would be well advised to take precautions against the Indians massacring the forts.⁷⁴

The warnings of Major Lewis were a good indication of the danger to which the Fort Loudoun expedition was prone, not only from the threat of a direct French attack, but also from the Overhill Indians themselves. With the French in earnest quest for their allegiance, the Cherokees' attitude toward the English changed from day to day. When the Mankiller of Tellico returned from the Alabama fort, implicating both Old Hop and Little Carpenter in the

⁷⁰Below, pp. 273-74. Demere had promised Little Carpenter he would keep the men at the fort until the Cherokee chieftains returned from Charleston. Captain John Postell, a militia company commander on the expedition, complained that his men had families to feed and could not wait until then before beginning to plant for the next season. John Postell to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, Dec. 25, 1756, Lyttelton Papers.

⁷¹Below, p. 301.

⁷²Below, p. 302.

⁷³Below, pp. 365-66, 396.

⁷⁴Below, pp. 202-4.

French intrigues, Demere finally decided to confront the two chiefs and attempt to win back their loyalty. Old Hop, while admitting his part, excused himself by saying that he had not intended to offend the English and swore that he was no longer interested in a French alliance.⁷⁶ Little Carpenter completely denied the charges: "It was a Lye, and now he would go the other Path which he knew, and never would know any other, and he would see whether his Father, the great King George, remembered him, and what talk the Governor brought for him."⁷⁶ Little Carpenter, with the agreement of Old Hop and other Cherokees, decided to accompany Stuart to Charleston to see Lyttelton. Although he could not get the governor to send him to England, Little Carpenter did persuade him to replace John Elliott, the hated Chote trader. Little Carpenter agreed, in return, to lead his nation against the French, and the commons, anxious to secure Cherokee support, decided to allow bounty payments for the scalps of Frenchmen and French Indians.⁷⁷

But these efforts to counteract French influence in the Cherokee nation were only partly successful. The bounty on scalps, for example, became a source of friction. The commons had set the bounty on scalps taken outside the towns at £18.7.6, payable in goods at Charleston rates. A double bounty was given for Frenchmen brought into Fort Prince George alive.⁷⁸ When the Indians made sorties down the Tennessee and Ohio rivers, after the Carpenter's return, they were not satisfied with the bounties, and tension between them and the Fort Loudoun garrison increased as a result. Demere had attempted to enlist the help of the Cherokees against the French even before Little Carpenter reached Charleston. Indian parties made reconnaissance missions to Fort Massac, an outpost which the French were building at the junction of the Tennessee and Ohio rivers, and attacked a few French and Indian parties. But Demere hoped for more. In January, while the Carpenter was on his way to Charleston, he met the Overhills in the town house at Chote and encouraged them to attack the French. Old Hop complained that since the traders had failed to supply guns and ammunition, the Indians' weapons were old and needed constant repair. "He could not send his People to fight with their Fists, . . . the French wore Shoes and would kick them . . ." ⁷⁹ There would be "time enough to take up the hatchet when the French attacked, but he did not yet know where the Enemy was lurking or where the Blood of a White Man or Indian was spilt, and where the Fire burnt cross." Demere replied that the English were fighting the French in the north and at home and that Old Hop should attack them to the south, as he had done before. He promised to give them powder, bullets, and flints and ask Lyttelton for guns. Oconostota, the Great Warrior of Chote, responded to Demere's exhortation by planning to raise a war party in the Middle settlements to go to Virginia's aid as soon as Little Carpenter returned from Charleston. Another forty men from Chilhowe and Telassee set out immediately. The war to the north

⁷⁶Below, pp. 224-25.

⁷⁶Below, pp. 269-70.

⁷⁷Council Journal, Jan. 31-Feb. 17, 1757, vol. 26, 14-62.

⁷⁸Commons Journal, Feb. 4, 1757, vol. 31, 35-36.

⁷⁹Below, pp. 338-39.

appealed to the Indians because of the prospect of receiving presents when they arrived in Virginia.⁸⁰

Most of the Overhills waited for Little Carpenter and Judge's Friend to return before they left. The little chieftain had promised Lyttelton that his men would go to the aid of Virginia as soon as the trees began to bud and that, barring trouble at home, he would accompany them himself. On Little Carpenter's return, the Overhills, instead of going toward Virginia, decided to strike at the French on the Ohio and the Mississippi. On July 30, a gang led by the Carpenter's brother brought in the scalp of a young French officer taken near Fort Massac. They were so dissatisfied with the bounty that Demere was forced to add clothing and ammunition and present a gun to the man who had killed the officer.⁸¹ In August, thirty-one warriors brought in five more scalps, which they claimed to be Savannah (though Little Carpenter later said they were Chickasaw). The braves were so angry with the meager bounty allowed them that they tore the clothes to pieces and loaded their guns. Although Demere prevented any violence, he was forced to supply more presents to put them in a good humor and get them to leave. When a new commander, Paul Demere (Raymond's brother), arrived at the fort, the Carpenter asked him to stop giving the bounty because it had caused his people to take Chickasaw scalps.⁸² Demere promised to report this to the governor. But until the bounty was cancelled, the mischief it caused would continue.

At the same time, there were serious difficulties in the trade. Shortly after his arrival, Paul Demere called Little Carpenter, the Great Warrior, and other head men to the fort to hear the governor's talk. Before he finished, the Cherokees interrupted him to say that both Glen and Lyttelton had promised them traders for their towns, and that neither had carried out his promise. It seemed to them the king chose his governors on the basis of their ability to tell lies. They had no powder and ball to defend themselves. Lyttelton had never carried out his promise to replace Elliott. Elliott's pack-horses had returned from Charleston empty. Little Carpenter was uneasy and felt ill-used by the English, for the French party, whose strength depended on their opposition to his policies, was profiting by the continued lack of trade.

Little Carpenter had emphasized the poor state of the trade to Lyttelton when he was in Charleston in February, and the commons house had then taken up the problem. The Indian affairs committee made a report in favor of placing the trade in some one man who would be responsible for maintaining a supply of goods on reasonable terms. Nothing came of this proposal, and the situation became worse. Except for Elliott, none of the Cherokee traders had licenses, nor could any go to Charleston to get goods. Moreover, Elliott himself went to Virginia in May, in an unsuccessful attempt to open trade from that colony. In July, Raymond Demere reported that, except for the little in the fort, there was not a round of ammunition in the nation. As the Indians had not hunted much the previous season, they were unable to pay the traders, who were themselves in debt. Except for Elliott, all the traders bought their

⁸⁰Below, p. 339.

⁸¹Below, p. 395.

⁸²Below, pp. 404-5; Talk of Old Hop, Little Carpenter and Paul Demere, August 30, 1757, encl. with Paul Demere to Lyttelton, August 31, 1757, Lyttelton Papers.

cargoes either from Goudy at Ninety Six or at Rea and Barksdale in Augusta. They bought their cargoes at prices twenty percent higher than those in Charleston, making their payments in leather, which the storekeepers then converted at much lower rates than those in town. The storekeepers, fully informed of the traders' plight, increased their prices to extend credit to the traders for the coming season.⁸³

Demere, finding that Elliott had decided to move to the Lower settlements because of his difficulties with the Overhill Indians, persuaded him to return to Keowee and bring up the ammunition Lyttelton had sent there for the Cherokees.⁸⁴ This served to relieve some of the Indians' uneasiness and enabled them to prepare to go hunting, which was necessary for their survival.

But solutions to the problems raised by the bounty on scalps and the inefficiency of trade were not enough. For the French were still actively trying to disrupt relations between the Cherokees and the English, and the Cherokees, especially Old Hop in the Overhills and some of the leading head men in the Lower settlements, were still not willing to sever their contacts with them. With the coming of spring in the mountains, the activities of the Savannahs and other French agents increased. Early in June, 1757, seven Savannahs arrived at Great Tellico. Demere, informed of their presence by a pack-horseman, called in Old Hop, the Standing Turkey, the Small Pox Conjuror of Settico, father of the Mankiller of Tellico, and Kenateta, the Mankiller's brother. With their reluctant help, an ambush was arranged. Men from the garrison waited along the path until the Savannahs left Tellico, killed three of them and wounded another, who escaped. Old Hop was disappointed that all of them were not shot, for he was afraid that word of the attack would reach the Savannahs in the Creek nation and endanger his emissaries there, while Demere hoped that this would provoke the French Indians into war with the Cherokees.⁸⁵

But the Savannahs chose to ignore the part the Cherokees played in the attack and took revenge against the English. In August, while Paul Demere was on his way to Fort Loudoun with a column of reinforcements, the wife of one of the men stationed at the fort came over the hills to join her husband. The poor woman was insane and with child. She was taken to Tellico by Indians pretending to help her. There, Savannah Tom and the Thigh, both accomplices of French John, who was in the nation at the time, murdered her. Raymond Demere had asked for the surrender of French John before, but Old Hop had refused to give him up on the grounds that he was his personal slave. Now he summoned Little Carpenter and Old Hop and demanded satisfaction. But both French John and the murderers escaped before a punitive party could reach Tellico.⁸⁶

In spite of the intrigues of the French and their Indians, relations between the Cherokees and the garrison at Fort Loudoun were improving. In July, 1757, nearly three hundred Cherokees went to Virginia, and on July 20, Demere reported that he had sent another thirty-one down the Tennessee

⁸³John Stuart to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, May 29, 1757 and July 11, 1757, *ibid.*

⁸⁴Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, August 31, 1757, *ibid.*

⁸⁵Below, pp. 381-87.

⁸⁶Below, pp. 333, 347, 397, 398.

River, in the direction of Fort Massac, which Little Carpenter had discovered the French building just below the fork of the Ohio. In the fall, after the Green Corn Dance, Little Carpenter and the Great Warrior told Demere they intended to go to war against the French themselves. They were given enough powder and ball to last a three or four months' expedition.⁸⁷ This seeming harmony was deceptive, for the problems of white settlement on the frontiers of Virginia and the Carolinas, aggravated by those resulting from the Cherokees' participation in the war with France, soon led to disaster.

Although the advance of Englishmen several hundred miles into the American wilderness inevitably increased friction between the Indians and whites, the troops and the Cherokees tolerated each other better than might have been expected. Yet along the settled frontier of the colony the situation became so bad that it finally erupted in a general massacre. Since 1755, the advance of white settlements into the back-country of the colony had produced increasing problems. There was friction over land, over stolen livestock, over the destruction of crops, and over insults and barbarities. The Cherokees had ceded the land between Long Canes and Ninety Six to Glen in 1747, opening to the settlers an area they had sought for some time. After this, settlers made their way up the Saluda River and along Stevens Creek. By 1752, thirty plats had been issued for land around Saluda and Ninety Six. The land on Stevens Creek, one of the principal tributaries of the Savannah River between New Windsor township and the Cherokee boundary line "at the Dividens," had been settled since 1750.⁸⁸ Stevens Creek settlers were followed by others on Long Cane Creek, the Indian boundary. Little River, of which Long Cane was a branch, was attractive because of its wide bottom lands, but it was several miles northwest of its tributary. A free Negro obtained a plat for land on Little River in 1751. Between 1754 and 1756, four surveys were made on the lower course of Little River.⁸⁹ Rapid development of the Long Cane and Little River valleys occurred after 1755. In all, about sixty plats were surveyed on Little River and its tributaries in 1758. The total number of head-rights represented amounted to 175.⁹⁰

A good understanding prevailed between the Indians and the settlers in the Long Cane area until some whites told the Cherokees that the newcomers were living on Indian land. Soon the settlers' horses and cattle began to disappear. These first Indian depredations were stopped by Glen, but they seemed to become irrepressible. In September, 1756, the Long Cane settlers, claiming that they had come from the frontiers of North Carolina and Virginia the previous winter and had secured Cherokee consent for their settlements, petitioned for protection against renewed attacks. The following month, Lyttelton complained about the plundering to a Lower settlement delegation visiting Charleston. The head man, Wawhatchee, solemnly promised to stop

⁸⁷Raymond Demere to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, July 20, 1757, Lyttelton Papers; R. A. Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758* . . . (Richmond: Virginia Historical Soc., 1894), vol. 2, 605.

⁸⁸Meriwether, *Expansion*, pp. 127-30.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 133-34.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.

the attacks. In January, 1757, Lyttelton met Little Carpenter and told him that the plundering still continued.⁹¹ Reprisals were not long delayed. Toward the end of the year, four Cherokees were murdered on Conkshell Creek, one of the branches of the Saluda River. Their skins were stolen and sold in Augusta. This crime proved most unfortunate. Late in February, 1758, James Beamer, a trader at Eastatoe in the Lower towns, warned Lyttelton that if the whites were the murderers, he was afraid the Indians would soon do mischief unless they were punished.⁹² Several days later, the warriors and head men of Keowee sent beads to the governor to show that the path was "not white and clear as it used to be, but full and full of Blood. Still we shall not kill any of the white People till we see wheather these People will be brought to Justice."⁹³ But the administration of justice was such that Lyttelton could do no more than give presents to the Cherokees' kinsmen to wipe away their tears and erase their memories. Some of the Cherokees did not wait to see if the governor would act; two white men from the settlements were killed later in the month. When Lyttelton sought satisfaction from the Carpenter, the wily head man complained that the Cherokees had not arms and ammunition for their defense and turned the onus of the affair on the governor by asking him what he intended to do about the Cherokee murders.⁹⁴

At the same time, a great number of Cherokees appeared in Virginia, to take part in the campaign of Brigadier General John Forbes against Fort Duquesne. Orders to capture the French stronghold had come from the crown, and the newly-appointed commander needed all the Indian support he could get. The Cherokees and Catawbias had proved useful the previous year at Winchester, where they were sent out to scout the surrounding countryside and make forays toward Fort Duquesne. Although the Virginians had not given enough presents, and the Indians had returned home dissatisfied, four hundred of them returned to Winchester early in April, 1758, and others planned to join them. William Byrd, Superintendent Atkin's assistant, met Little Carpenter and seventy Cherokees on their way to Charleston and persuaded them to promise that they, too, would go to Virginia. Byrd then went to the nation and found so many of the Cherokees either already in Virginia or out against the French on the Tennessee River that he could find only sixty Lower townsmen to return with him. Lord Loudoun, the commander-in-chief of British forces in America, then asked South Carolina to send yet more warriors to Virginia before the season was too far advanced. But in May, Lieutenant Colonel Probart Howarth, who had been sent to the nation to find these additional warriors, reported that there were already four to five hundred Cherokees in Virginia, not counting those with Colonel Byrd, and that another two hundred had gone down the Tennessee River to harass the enemy there. Howarth was credibly informed that, with the exception of the men at Tellico and Chatuga, there were not a hundred warriors left in the nation.⁹⁵

On their arrival at Winchester, the Cherokees demanded more presents

⁹¹Council Journal, Oct. 14, 1756, vol. 25, 384-85 and Jan. 31, 1757, vol. 26, 26-27.

⁹²Below, pp. 421, 425-26, 441-42.

⁹³Below, pp. 443-44.

⁹⁴Council Journal, April 11, 1758, vol. 26, 152-57, 177.

⁹⁵Council Journal, May 12, 1758, *ibid.*, 327.

than the commander, Colonel George Washington, could supply. Although Forbes met some of their demands with presents and arms from Philadelphia, the Cherokees grew restless waiting for the English to move into battle. Restlessness turned into contempt for the English, who seemed to be afraid. Forbes's strategy, inherited from Loudoun, was to take the French fort at the forks of the Ohio. But unlike Braddock, who three years earlier had planned a swift movement through the wilderness, Forbes intended to build posts and supply depots along the way to the enemy fort, to defend his supply path and keep his lines of communication open. In this, Cherokee support was not immediately useful. As the time dragged by, the Indians, who were to serve as the eyes and ears of Forbes's army, despaired of waiting and started to make their way home through the settlements. As they passed through Halifax and Bedford counties in southwest Virginia, the Cherokee warriors began stealing horses, plundering houses, and frightening the settlers. When they refused to acknowledge any friendship for the English or return stolen property and livestock, hostilities with the Virginians broke out, and a number of warriors were killed.⁹⁶

When the Cherokees reached home they demanded revenge. In July, it was rumored that warriors from the Lower and Middle towns were planning a surprise attack on the fort at Keowee.⁹⁷ Little Carpenter promised to try to dissuade them. Late in September, he was persuaded by Glen, the former governor, to take a party back to Virginia, fulfilling the promise he had made to Byrd earlier in the year, and attempt to reach an understanding with the Virginians.⁹⁸ At the same time, Old Hop refused to let the Overhill warriors join the Lower and Middle townsmen in their planned assault on the Virginia settlements in the fall and promised to keep Lyttelton informed.

In the meantime, Lachlan McIntosh, the commander of Fort Prince George, informed the governor that the Lower townsmen were serious in their preparations for war against the Virginians. Lyttelton suggested that the Middle and Lower Cherokees call back their warriors and ask the governor of Virginia for satisfaction. In return, he would send the dead men's relatives presents to "hide their bones and wipe away their tears."⁹⁹ A month later, in November, a large party from the Lower towns, led by Tistoe of Hiwassee, came to Charleston. Although Wawhatchee, the leader of the war party, was not present, Tistoe could speak for fourteen towns. Lyttelton informed him that he knew they had asked the Creeks and Chickasaws to join them in an attack on the Virginians and that he knew both tribes had refused. Until the Cherokees stopped attacking the Virginians and agreed to honor their treaties with the king, Lyttelton would prevent any goods or ammunition from reaching them. Tistoe promised to comply, and agreed to receive a peace mission from Virginia.¹⁰⁰

In Virginia itself, Little Carpenter and his party concluded their peace talks and joined Forbes's expedition against Fort Duquesne. But two days

⁹⁶Below, pp. 463-70.

⁹⁷Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, July 30, 1758, Lyttelton Papers.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1758.

⁹⁹Below, p. 481.

¹⁰⁰Council Journal, Nov. 8 & Nov. 16, 1758, vol. 28, 33-34, 38-40.

before the fort fell, the Cherokees, learning from some Savannahs that the French were about to abandon it, deserted. Little Carpenter was immediately charged and brought before General Forbes. When Forbes released him, Attakullakulla went to Williamsburg to see Governor Fauquier, and explained that he had not come to Virginia to fight, but to negotiate, and that he had been persuaded to join Forbes against his will. In April, 1759, the Little Carpenter arrived in Charleston, presented Governor Lyttelton with a Talonochee scalp, denied that he was a deserter, and complained that former Governor Glen had prevented him from getting his guns. While Lyttelton, unlike Fauquier, was not satisfied with the Carpenter's excuses, relations with the Cherokees had so far deteriorated that he was forced to accept them. In March, William Richardson, a missionary, had reported that the Overhills had refused to hear him preach until the warrior returned, resented the way their people had been treated in Virginia, and were so generally disaffected with the English that he had been forced to leave the nation.¹⁰¹ Moreover, there were new and alarming reports about the activities of the French, who had built a corn-house at Coosawatchee and sent the Mortar, a powerful Creek headman, to the Cherokees with a request that he be allowed to settle at Old Hiwassee; and there were new rumors that an attack on Fort Loudoun was planned.¹⁰² In face of this, Lyttelton badly needed Attakullakulla's friendship, especially if Old Hiwassee were not to become a center for contacts with the French. He asked the chief to stay with his people and try to keep peace with the Virginians. After an absence of nearly seven months, the Little Carpenter headed back to the Overhills.¹⁰³

But Lyttelton's efforts to keep the peace were not successful. The Cherokees decided to avenge their losses in Virginia on the people of the Carolina back country, "where they could do it safely."¹⁰⁴ Early in May, a gang suddenly struck unsuspecting settlers on the Catawba and Yadkin rivers, taking fifteen scalps from men, women, and children. During the month, many warriors were reported leaving the Middle settlements to attack the Virginia frontier. From this time on, relations with the tribe rapidly deteriorated. Moittoi of Hiwassee, head man of the Valley towns, went to Mobile to talk with the French, and the Mortar's camp in the fork of the Coosa and Coosawatchee rivers became a gathering place for the Hiwassee Indians. The French were expected to supply the camp with arms and ammunition.¹⁰⁵

Wawhatchee, Tistoe, and Round O (from Stickoe in the Middle settlements) all attempted to place the blame for the Indian outrages on the men of Settico. Thirteen towns sent the governor a talk disclaiming any designs against the white people and proposing to forget those who had been killed "on both sides."¹⁰⁶ But the colonial authorities were not prepared to ignore the outrages, and the Cherokees refused to go any further toward restoring their relations with Carolina. The leading head men, Old Hop, Standing

¹⁰¹Wm. Richardson to Lyttelton, March 14, 1759, Lyttelton Papers.

¹⁰²Council Journal, March 19, 1759, vol. 28, 66-67.

¹⁰³Council Journal, April 17-21, 1759, *ibid.*, 77-83.

¹⁰⁴Arthur Dobbs to Lyttelton, Brunswick, May 25, 1759, Lyttelton Papers.

¹⁰⁵Below, pp. 492-94.

¹⁰⁶Below, pp. 494-95.

Turkey, the Great Warrior, and Osteneco, sent the Slave Catcher of Chote to the French to urge them to fulfil their promises to set up trade and build a fort. The Slave Catcher agreed to build houses for the French at their new settlement on the Coosa and to manage their affairs with the Cherokee.¹⁰⁷

In this menacing situation, the English garrison at Fort Loudoun faced starvation from a shortage of flour. The governor and council ordered the contractor to get a six months' supply of food to the fort immediately and sent seventy officers and men, under John Stuart (who had returned to Charleston), to reinforce Demere. Late in September, news of more Cherokee attacks reached Charleston. Lyttelton lost no time. He ordered the regiments nearest the frontier to draft half of their men and hold them for further orders, requested aid from the Chickasaws at New Savannah and the Catawbas, ordered the troops in the city to prepare to march, asked Atkin to get the Breed Camp Chickasaws and the Creeks to fall on the Upper Cherokee towns, and appealed to Virginia to reinforce Fort Loudoun.¹⁰⁸ The commons, meeting on October 5, approved the calling up of the militia for an expedition to the frontier, and the governor made plans to accompany the troops himself.

The embargo on goods and ammunition bound for the Cherokees was rigidly enforced. Richard Smith was turned back from Salisbury, North Carolina, with loaded pack-horses. John McQueen, a Charleston merchant, who reported that he had sent two thousand weight of powder and ball to the nation since June and had requests for more, was ordered to suspend all trade.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, the embargo was so effective that Oconostota, the Great Warrior of Chote, decided to go to Charleston with Wawhatchee and a group of Lower Indians to try to get it lifted. In Charleston, Oconostota tried to explain the murder of two white men recently killed in the Upper towns and threw a bundle of deer skins at the governor's feet. But Lyttelton refused these tokens of peace. Tistoe blamed the recent outbreaks on the soldiers at Fort Prince George: he accused their commander, Lieutenant Coytmore, of drunkenness and debauchery and complained that the garrison abused the townspeople.

Rather than answer the Cherokees at once, Lyttelton referred the matter to the council, who advised him to demand the surrender and execution of the murderers. It was suggested that Lyttelton keep the Cherokee emissaries in town, as hostages, until the guilty were delivered up. The governor at first rejected this plan, on the grounds that the Indians had come at his invitation and had not been authorized to give satisfaction. Even if the Cherokees then in town agreed to surrender the guilty, the nation would not be bound by their decision. Instead, Lyttelton announced that he would shortly lead the expedition to demand satisfaction himself; the Cherokees now in town could return home in safety. The council divided on the question, four in favor of the expedition and four in favor of keeping hostages.¹¹⁰ To gain the council's support for his expedition to the Lower towns, Lyttelton decided to take the

¹⁰⁷Talk of Buffalo Skin to Paul Demere, August 1, 1759, encl. with Paul Demere to Lyttelton, Fort Loudoun, August 28, 1759, Lyttelton Papers.

¹⁰⁸Council Journal, August 14, 1759, vol. 28, 115-16.

¹⁰⁹Council Journal, Oct. 1-4, 1759, *ibid.*, 122-24.

¹¹⁰Council Journal, Oct. 18-19 & Oct. 22, 1759, *ibid.*, 132-34.

Indians hostage, too. That afternoon, he told Oconostota that he and the other Cherokees would have to accompany the army to Fort Prince George for protection through the settlements.

The Cherokees realized they were hostages. By the time they reached the Congarees, Lyttelton thought it wise to reassure the Lower towns and sent out a messenger, accompanied by Elliott, to explain his purpose. But the messenger proved treacherous. At Oconostota's suggestion, he told the people of the Lower towns, gathered in the town house at Keowee, that Oconostota, Round O, and all the other members of the Indian party, were being held as slaves, that they could not move without being watched by the white people, and that Lyttelton's army was coming up to destroy their towns and capture their women and children. The Indians responded by sending a runner to the Middle settlements with black wampum. He was to send other runners to the Valley and the Overhills. The messenger suggested that, if the headmen thought they had sufficient strength to do so, they should attack Lyttelton somewhere between Ninety Six and the fort, before he reached Cherokee country.¹¹¹ The attack failed to materialize, and Lyttelton reached Fort Prince George on December 9, with a force of about seventeen hundred men. He immediately released all the Cherokee hostages, except for twenty-four men who were to remain at Fort Prince George until the murderers were turned over.

Ten days later, Little Carpenter came to Keowee to treat with Lyttelton, bringing a French prisoner as a present for the governor. He was able to deliver two of the murderers to the fort and secure Tistoe's release, but he could not persuade Lyttelton to release the other prisoners. This delay was disastrous for the expedition. Measles raged in the camp, and a smallpox epidemic was reported among the Catawbas. Since there were Catawba warriors in the Lower towns, some of the soldiers became alarmed and deserted. The governor was now in such a desperate position that he was forced to make peace. On December 26, he agreed to let the traders return and promised to release the hostages as soon as a similar number of offenders was surrendered. Two days later, symptoms of smallpox appeared in the camp, and Lyttelton indicated to his soldiers that those who wished to do so could return home. The men lost no time in leaving the fort, and Lyttelton's army soon melted away. In spite of the hero's welcome given him on his return to Charleston, Lyttelton's expedition had failed. He had not secured an accommodation with the Cherokees, and only war could now accomplish his objectives. Indeed, Lyttelton's failure only encouraged the Indians to take up the hatchet and turned their hatred of the English to white heat.

Coytmore had refused to release the hostages after the governor's departure, which further provoked the Indians. On January 19, a party of seventy Cherokees, led by the Young Warrior of Estatoe, concealing hatchets beneath their blankets, attempted to gain entrance to the fort at Keowee. But Coytmore was warned by Thomas Beamer, James Beamer's half-breed son, who had accompanied them to the fort, and foiled them. At the same time, a number of traders were attacked.

¹¹¹Richard Coytmore to Lyttelton, Nov. 11, 1759, Lyttelton Papers.

But the fiasco at Fort Prince George incensed the Lower townsmen. With help from the Middle and Valley settlements, they launched a massive attack on the frontier settlers. The colony had not suffered such a shock since 1715, when the Yamasee and Creek Indians had struck at the outlying settlements. Most of the settlers between Long Canes and Ninety Six were either killed, taken prisoner, or driven into small forts. The few who escaped had to flee as far south as Saxe Gotha.¹¹²

Back at Fort Prince George, the Great Warrior engineered Coytmore's death. On the pretext that he wanted to go to Charleston to see the governor, Oconostota lured the hated officer out of the fort and down to the river which ran in front of it. A party of armed Cherokees had slipped down to the opposite bank before sunrise. At a signal from Oconostota, they suddenly opened fire on the unsuspecting commander and fatally wounded him. Alexander Miln, the second in command, afraid that the hostages would also attack, put them in irons. When the Indians resisted their guards, they were shot.¹¹³

The Cherokees then retired to the villages to take care of their wounded. Charleston heard of the massacres when Thomas Beamer rode into the city on January 31. Lyttelton quickly summoned aid from North Carolina and Virginia and informed General Amherst, who commanded royal troops in the colonies. Since an attack by the Creeks from the southwest would add a terrible blow, Edmund Atkin and Henry Ellis, the governor of Georgia, made every effort to bring them to attack the Cherokees. These efforts were not successful, but apart from a few outbreaks against their traders in May, 1760, the Creeks did at least hold to a policy of neutrality.

The colony was ill equipped for war. The assembly had been so apathetic about the war with France that only three companies had been raised for the first regiment since its authorization, and the second regiment consisted of less than one hundred and twenty-five men. An emergency session of the assembly provided for seven ranger companies and continued the provincials raised in 1757. A new regiment was to be formed to relieve Fort Prince George, but Fort Loudoun was completely cut off and could not be reached. Militia companies in the back country were ordered to patrol the forks of the Edisto and the area around Ninety Six. New ranger companies were organized in the field. By April, most of the seven troops were filled. The frontier garrisons were put on provincial pay, and funds were provided to relieve settlers taking refuge in the forts.

As the relief force for Fort Prince George failed to appear, for lack of support among the colonists, the expedition against the Cherokees had to rely upon regular troops from the north. It took two separate undertakings to restore peace. Amherst's first contingent, twelve hundred men under the command of Colonel Archibald Montgomery, arrived in Charleston harbor on April 1. Accompanied by three hundred and fifty provincial rangers and foot soldiers, Montgomery marched to Fort Prince George in a show of force and waited for the Indians to sue for peace. But he found that the Indians needed more than the mere appearance of British regulars and launched an attack on

¹¹²Below, p. 495.

¹¹³Below, pp. 497-500.

the Middle settlements. Five miles from Echoe, Montgomery was ambushed, and his rear guard and supply train cut off. Although the rear guard managed to beat off their attackers and rejoin the army, the British commander retreated through the Lower settlements to Fort Prince George, without even destroying crops in the fields, returned to Charleston, and, obeying Amherst's orders to chastise the Indians and return, went back to New York.

Montgomery's failure to crush the Cherokees sealed the fate of Fort Loudoun. With all chance of outside relief cut off, the fort was starved into submission. The Great Warrior granted permission for the garrison to march to Virginia or to Fort Prince George in return for their supplies, their ammunition, and the great guns in the fort. The Indians who escorted the garrison during the first day's march disappeared that night. The next morning, the troops were attacked. Paul Demere, the commanding officer, was captured and tortured to death. Of the remaining one hundred and twenty survivors; only John Stuart, who was ransomed by Little Carpenter and hurriedly taken to Virginia, escaped captivity.

The English could not ignore the fall of Fort Loudoun and sent a second force, led by Lieutenant Colonel Grant, who had been Montgomery's adjutant, to South Carolina. Grant arrived at Fort Prince George on May 27, 1761 and invaded the Middle settlements again. About two miles from the point where Montgomery had been ambushed, the Cherokees attacked. Although neither side won a clear victory, the Indians withdrew, allowing Grant to raze fifteen Middle towns and destroy all crops.

Grant returned to Fort Prince George without waiting for peace overtures from the Indians. Had he stayed in the settlements to press terms, the colony might have obtained a more favorable peace. Lieutenant Governor William Bull opened the way for negotiations in April, 1761 when he sent Grant a draft treaty. But the war party in the nation was so strong that Attakullakulla was not in a position to sue for terms until two months after the British troops had returned to Fort Prince George. The colony demanded the execution of at least four of the Cherokee murderers, but Little Carpenter could not agree to this without authority from the Indian towns.

Faced with an ever-increasing public debt and the refusal of the British commander to listen to sound advice, the assembly abandoned the demand for satisfaction (even though a committee of the commons reported that this would make the treaty meaningless) and revoked the treaty of 1730.¹¹⁴ In the treaty which was finally adopted, the re-opening of trade was made conditional upon the surrender of all prisoners, slaves, and livestock captured by the Cherokees. The French were barred from the nation and the English were allowed to build forts at any point in the Cherokee country. The boundary line was to be forty miles below Keowee, instead of the twenty-six miles originally proposed by the colony. The province had practically sued for peace and was to find that only the threat of a continuing embargo on trade could hold the Cherokees to the treaty. The new boundary had to be confirmed at the Congress of Augusta two years later.

¹¹⁴Meriwether, *Expansion*, pp. 239-40.

With the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, the immediate threat of French expansion on the eastern seaboard was removed. The British government, in the wake of problems raised by the peace and by the events of the war, began to bring a restraining influence into colonial Indian affairs. The problems of western settlement were controlled by a series of boundary settlements with the tribes on the frontier, and since both the crown and the colonies were aware of the abuses in Indian trade which had helped to produce the Cherokee War, steps to limit and control it were taken. Moreover, both the need for an ambitious Indian policy, which had been produced by fear of French encroachment and by the extension of white settlement, and a willingness to undertake one, which had been discredited by the tragic events of the past five years, were over-riden by the desire to maintain peace.

While the weaknesses of the Cherokee treaty were therefore less disturbing than they might have been five years earlier, the reform and restoration of trade had still to be undertaken. Although the Cherokees wanted to return to the old trading system, the need for a new solution to the old problems of the Indian trade was plain. The commons had already decided to initiate some measure of government participation when the new governor, Thomas Boone, recommended an exclusive public monopoly. The resulting "Act to regulate the Trade with the Cherokee Indians, by taking the same into the hands of the Publick of this Province" revived the public monopoly which had first been used to restore trade after the Yamasee War, in 1716.¹¹⁶ Then, a well-regulated and supervised factory system had ended the abuses which brought on the war and considerably improved Indian relations.

Boone's new system became the model for other colonies to follow. The Cherokee trade was put in the hands of five "directors" and a factor, at Fort Prince George, whom they appointed. None of the directors could be members of the assembly or the council. They supplied the factor and set his prices. They sold his skins in lots of fifty at auctions in Charleston, advertising them in the gazettes ten days before sale, and gave public notice before buying goods or hiring wagons. The directors were allowed 2½ percent commissions on the goods they bought and the skins they sold. Although the Indians received better treatment under this system, they did not like the limiting of trade to the Lower town of Keowee and, through Kettagusta, Little Carpenter, Wil-linebaugh, and others, repeatedly asked for the trade to be expanded to accommodate the Overhills.¹¹⁶ But South Carolina, fearing a recurrence of the old abuses in the Overhill trade, was reluctant to agree.¹¹⁷ Virginia traders were now supplying the Upper towns. The royal proclamation of 1763, which opened trade to all British subjects, cut the legal grounds for the monopoly, and a South Carolina ordinance of October 6, 1764 dissolved it.¹¹⁸ The factor, Edward Wilkinson, continued to trade at Keowee, however, until late in 1765, in order to dispose of stock on hand. When the accounts were adjusted and the books closed, Gabriel Manigault, the cashier of the public trade, paid the

¹¹⁶Below, pp. 557-63.

¹¹⁷Council Journal, Nov. 19, 1762, "old vol. 3," 566, and March 14, 1763, vol. 29, 26-42; *South Carolina Gazette*, Dec. 11, 1762.

¹¹⁸*South Carolina Gazette*, July 20, 1763.

¹¹⁹Below, pp. 593-94.

treasurer of the province £9,248.6.7½ current money. The total amount of stock invested was £15,000 currency; the loss to the colony for the three years the monopoly was in operation was £3,932.17.7 current money.¹¹⁹ With prices low, competition from other colonies, the opening of free trade, and the limitation of public trade to the vicinity of Keowee, it is surprising that the loss was not greater.

South Carolina's attempt to adopt a new approach to Indian trade foreshadowed the decision of the crown to place it under imperial control. During the past half-century, regulation of the trade by each colony on an individual basis had proved inadequate. Yet the crown was not willing to tolerate a public monopoly of the trade, for that would clash with England's mercantile interests. Nevertheless, the new British trade policy involved more than an attempt to control dishonest traders, for a unified and efficient supervision of trade replaced the expensive individual colonial commissioners. In addition to their desire for administrative economy, the British had another, more important objective: they wanted to check the decline in the skin and fur trade by stopping any further expansion of settlement west into the Indian hunting grounds. John Stuart, who succeeded Edmund Atkin as superintendent of Indian affairs in 1763, approaching each colony separately, made a strenuous effort to obtain a better regulation of the trade. Governor Montagu and the South Carolina council approved his proposals in April, 1767. Stuart then presented the same proposals to both the traders and the Cherokees at a congress at Hard Labor Creek on May 19, 1767. The Creeks and their traders heard them several days later at Augusta. Prices for trade goods were agreed on, and the old differential between Cherokee and Creek prices was retained: a trading gun cost a Cherokee fourteen deer skins, a Creek, sixteen.¹²⁰ Stuart's assistants, known as "commissaries," were to enforce the regulations.

These regulations were hardly under way before the crown returned control of the trade to the colonies. In consequence, supervision of the trade became ineffective. It was not until June 27, 1769, nearly a year later and six months after the old rules had expired, that Governor Montagu recommended that the assembly consider new ones.¹²¹ Although Montagu pointed out that there had already been some disturbances between the Indians and the traders, the committee did not report in a bill until August 8.¹²² Then, instead of passing the bill, the house appointed another committee to consider regulations which could be submitted to the other colonies for their agreement. That fall, Lieutenant Governor Bull, in Montagu's absence, reminded the commons of the need for a new act, pointing out the need for rules which would prevent settlement beyond the Indian boundaries agreed on at Augusta, keep white hunters out of the hunting grounds, and prohibit trade with the Indians in the settlements.¹²³ A house committee reported on the message in March, 1770, and recommended that commissioners from neighboring colonies meet to fix general trade regulations, decide how crimes committed in the Indian country

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰Council Journal, June 12, 1767, vol. 33, 168-73.

¹²¹Commons Journal, June 27, 1769, vol. 38, pt. 1, 11.

¹²²Commons Journal, August 8, 1769, *ibid.*, 127, 140-41.

¹²³Commons Journal, Nov. 28, 1769, vol. 38, pt. 2, 190.

were to be punished, and settle the question of jurisdiction over whites living there. Three days later, the commons agreed to bring in a bill providing for such cooperation with other colonies.¹²⁴ This bill never materialized, and unregulated trade continued.

In September, 1772, Stuart reported to the council that a major cause of Indian unrest lay in the fact that traders were no longer required to have licenses or to take out bonds for good behavior, as the 1763 proclamation had intended.¹²⁵ Bull must have then taken steps to remedy the lack of regulations, for when a crisis arose in relations between Georgia and the Creeks, as a result of Creek murders in the "ceded lands," and Governor Wright called for an embargo on the Creek trade, Bull suspended "such Licenses for Trading to the Creek Nation as he had heretofore granted."¹²⁶ Georgia adopted new trade regulations for the Creeks in a peace treaty with the tribe on October 20, 1774. Lieutenant Governor Bull, on the advice of the council, adopted the same rules for South Carolina's Creek trade and lifted the embargo. At the same time, he revoked all old licenses and called for applications for new ones.¹²⁷ The Creek crisis served to revive the regulatory powers the superintendent had enjoyed in 1765: Wright entrusted the enforcement of the Georgia rules to Stuart and his assistants; Governor Peter Chester of Florida followed suit; and Bull evidently did the same (although there is no formal authorization in the council records). But the colonies grasped the advantages of such cooperative regulation too late. By the time it became effective, the events of the Revolution were creating a new nation, with new Indian problems to be solved.

Colonial land policy still presented grave problems. With the close of the war against France, the Indians were the only immediate barrier to the westward expansion of the Atlantic colonies, and settlers were eager to move into the newly-won territories of Florida and eastern Louisiana. In order to control this western emigration, which had already helped to provoke two Indian wars, the crown reserved all the new territory except Quebec and the Floridas to the Indians and prohibited any new settlement beyond the Allegheny divide. No treaties or deeds transferring Indian land could be made without a public meeting arranged by the superintendent and attended by the representatives of all Indian claimants, and no colonial governor could grant any Indian land to white settlers.

Imperial settlement of the boundaries with Indian nations began at the Congress of Augusta in 1763. At the time John Stuart became superintendent, relations with all the southern Indians were strained. The Cherokees still had serious complaints against the English in regard to their trade and lands. The factory at Fort Prince George did not satisfy them, and lands claimed by the Cherokees in the valley of the Kanawha River were being taken by settlers from Virginia. The Catawbias wanted more adequate safeguards for their

¹²⁴Commons Journal, March 13, 1770, *ibid.*, 317, 329.

¹²⁵Council Journal, Sept. 26, 1772, vol. 36, pt. 2, 180-81. The question of prosecuting unlicensed traders was referred to the attorney general, but not taken up again by the council.

¹²⁶Council Journal, April 21, 1774, vol. 38, 37.

¹²⁷MS Miscellaneous Records of the Secretary of the Province, Book RR, 1774-79, 125, South Carolina Archives.

lands. The Choctaws were still a doubtful quantity, and the Creeks were downright hostile. The Chickasaws remained friendly, but were dissatisfied with the trade. Stuart had to make sure that these grievances did not become the basis of another conspiracy such as that conceived by Pontiac in the northwest. At Augusta, Stuart and the southern governors met the head men, hoping to remove any misgivings which the withdrawal of the French and Spanish might have caused and to remedy their grievances. In a treaty drawn up at this congress, the Catawbias were promised a survey of their reservation, the Creeks were given a new boundary with Georgia, and the Chickasaws and Choctaws were given traders from Mobile, which eliminated the danger of attacks on their traders from the Creeks.¹²⁸

But Cherokee land grievances were not redressed. In 1764, North Carolina began granting land as far west as the mountains, while South Carolina permitted occupation of land which the tribe claimed west of Long Canes. Bull made an attempt to define the boundary in April, 1765, in such a way that white settlements would stay within the colony. But the Cherokees refused to negotiate without Stuart, whom they expected to support them. To their surprise, Stuart advised the Indians to cede all the frontier settlements to South Carolina. On October 19, 1765, Alexander Cameron, commissary for the Cherokees, and Ensign Price, commander of Fort Prince George, met a Cherokee delegation and secured an agreement, on the lines of Stuart's proposal, transferring all Indian land between DeWitt's Corner (about six miles northwest of the present Due West) and Long Canes. The line was drawn in the spring of 1766 by Cameron, Edward Wilkinson, a Mr. Pickens, the surveyor for South Carolina, and a party of Cherokees. Beginning at a point on the Savannah River about ten miles above the mouth of Rocky Creek, the line ran directly northeast through DeWitt's Corner to the Reedy River, a northern branch of the Saluda.¹²⁹ The Cherokees then asked to have this boundary extended through North Carolina. In a meeting with Governor Tryon of North Carolina at Hard Labor Creek, the Cherokees agreed on a line running from the point on the Reedy River where the South Carolina boundary stopped to Tryon Mountain in North Carolina, and from there to John Chiswell's lead mine on the upper Kanawha River in Virginia. As soon as the survey was completed in 1767, Tryon evicted all settlers west of the new boundary and announced that no land would be granted within one mile of it.¹³⁰ The boundary separating the Cherokee country from the two colonies was now established and did not change until the Revolution.¹³¹

But the boundary settlements with the Cherokees did not prevent white encroachment on their lands. Former traders like Richard Pearis and Edward Wilkinson, with help from leading head men, attempted to obtain large grants from the Indians. Stuart was able to thwart some of these efforts. In the

¹²⁸The survey was roughly fifteen miles square, and a copy of it is recorded in MS Miscellaneous Records of the Secretary of State, Book H, 1831-34; 461a, South Carolina Archives; Alden, *Stuart*, pp. 176-77.

¹²⁹Meriwether, *Expansion*, p. 249.

¹³⁰Alden, *Stuart*, pp. 219-21.

¹³¹Both lines were confirmed at the Treaty of Hard Labor, Oct. 14, 1768: Miscellaneous Records, Book OO, 1767-71, 1-5.

summer of 1768, for example, Oconostota and Saluy tried to give Alexander Cameron's half-breed son a piece of land twelve miles square in the Saluda valley, above the Indian boundary, arguing that he was an Indian to whom the king's proclamation did not apply. Stuart's opposition prevented the cession. In the winter of 1768-69, a Virginia trader, David Ross, tried to get some Cherokee lands which were earmarked for him approved by Stuart. Stuart appealed to Lord Hillsborough, the colonial secretary, who instructed him not to include such a cession in the treaty he was to negotiate at Lochaber.¹⁸³ Pearis was more successful. By a secret agreement with the Lower Cherokees, his half-breed son was ceded one hundred and forty-four square miles in the upper Saluda valley, and although this grant, too, was not approved at Lochaber, he could not be prevented from taking possession of the land. When Stuart appealed to the governor, James Simpson, the attorney general, reported that the act of 1739 (which prohibited all persons from purchasing Indian lands without authority from the king or the governor) applied to Pearis and advised Governor Montagu to prosecute.¹⁸³ Pearis and his accomplice, Jacob Hite, were tried in the new court at Ninety Six, found guilty, forced to renounce their titles, and fined. But the following year Pearis placed the grant in his son's name, had it surveyed, and got Edward Rutledge to give him title to the land in the same court. Pearis then settled on the land. He lost it during the Revolution and was compensated by the British Loyalist Commission.¹⁸⁴

A more clear-cut case of local interest coming into conflict with the authority of the crown occurred when William Henry Drayton attempted to lease the land reserved to the Catawbas. The head men of the tribe frequently appeared before the governor and council to complain of white people trespassing on their reserved hunting grounds. Rumors began to circulate that they were prepared to abandon their ancient home, and King Frow, the Catawba chief, found it necessary to send Captain Airs, a young warrior, to Charleston to deny them.¹⁸⁵ Early in June, 1771, the tribe was attacked by a group of back settlers.¹⁸⁶ The following year, the council devised a plan to allow Drayton a twenty-one year lease on the Catawba land, reserving to the Indians their corn fields, their towns, and their liberty to hunt. In return, Drayton was to pay each gunman one guinea's worth of goods each year. If the Indians did not agree to the terms, or if treaties or instructions from the crown forbade it, the lease would be void. The Catawbas were to be told that this lease would be the best way to preserve their lands from white squatters.

Stuart wrote to the governor and council on December 28, 1772, opposing the lease, and his letter was considered on January 20. He said that the fifteen mile square had been reserved to the Catawbas by the Treaty of Augusta in 1763 and had never been ceded. Such a cession could not be negotiated by

¹⁸³ Alden, *Stuart*, pp. 298-99.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 299-300; Council Journal, Sept. 26, 1772, vol. 36, pt. 2, 179-80.

¹⁸⁴ Alden, *Stuart*, pp. 299-300.

¹⁸⁵ Council Journal, March 20, 1771, vol. 36, pt. 1, 70-71.

¹⁸⁶ Council Journal, July 12, 1771, *ibid.*, 142.

anyone but himself.¹⁸⁷ Stuart felt that he could not sanction any lease obtained from the Catawbias as a result of a letter written them by the clerk of the council and that the proposal was too important, especially in its effect on other tribes, to have been approved without deliberation. He added that the attorney general believed the lease could not be made consistent either with the treaty or with the crown's instructions.¹⁸⁸ These protests were effective, and the lease was never confirmed.

In the spring of 1773, the system of granting land in the colonies came under consideration in England. On orders from the crown, Lieutenant Governor Bull suspended the granting of land until a new system was put into effect. On February 5, 1774, the colonial secretary sent out a circular letter describing the new regulations. In future, land surveys were to be shown on maps before the grants could be made, and the land was to be sold in small lots at public auction. Four months notice of the sale was to be given in neighboring provinces.¹⁸⁹ This did not affect warrants for lands which had not yet been located, nor claims which had already been approved.

Whatever effect the regulations may have had on the efforts of whites to settle beyond the treaty boundaries, they came too late to be of any real significance. Until 1763, the colony had had the burden of preventing encroachments on the hunting grounds, and from 1739 to 1755, the local government had done a fairly good job of preserving the boundaries between whites and Indians. The natural growth of the settlements had made conflict with the Cherokees over their lands inevitable. Negotiation for additional land for settlement had not come until after the Cherokee War, and then the boundaries had merely recognized existing settlements. The Cherokee War, indeed, brought into sharp focus the fact that one colony could no longer even handle land and trade problems with a single tribe like the Cherokees, whose claims bordered on North Carolina and Virginia, as well as on South Carolina and Georgia. The appointment of an Indian superintendent met the need for a consistent approach toward the Indians on the land problem.

While the problem of Indian lands was thus temporarily solved, conditions on the Carolina frontier also improved as a result of the decline in the Indian trade. The colony's economic interest in the Indians was no longer as vital as it had been during the golden era of the 1750s, although, as Lieutenant Governor Bull reported to the Board of Trade in 1770, the Cherokee tribe was still important as a buffer against possible attack from other tribes.¹⁴⁰

The results of the French and Indian War substantially ended South Carolina's concern with tribes, other than the Cherokees, who lay beyond her borders. And the Cherokees, themselves, became more firmly attached to the imperial cause, partly as a result of Stuart's intelligence in handling them. In 1776, the tribe, angered by land-seeking settlers and incited by "talks" from

¹⁸⁷The king's orders were referred to in the Report of the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations on April 15, 1768.

¹⁸⁸Council Journal, Jan. 20, 1773, vol. 37, 27-28.

¹⁸⁹Jack M. Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness, The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 226-27.

¹⁴⁰Public Record Office Transcripts, vol. 32, 1770-72, 403.

northern tribes, again attacked the frontier . The Carolinians used this evidence of the Cherokees' loyalty to the crown as an opportunity to rid themselves of the last significant threat to their security from neighboring tribes. With the peace treaty of 1777, the colony's concern with southeastern Indian affairs largely passed into the hands of the new continental government.